



THE ASSUMPTION OF ENCUMBRANCES BY THE
PURCHASER OF LAND.
(Concludedfrom June No.)
L Pennsylvania it appears most clearly both that the purchaser
of encumbered premises incurs no personal resp6nsibility without
special agreement, express or implied, and that the responsibility,
when incurred, is only to indemnify his'grantor. In the early
case of .Kearney v. Tanner, 17 S. & R. 94, a grantor who had
been compelled to pay the deficiency on the mortgage-debt after a
sale of the premises, brought assumpsit for the same against his
grantee, who had bought with a knowledge of the encumbrances.
McKEAN, J., in the lower court, charged the jury that, "The de-
fendant was liable to pay the ground-rent and encumbrances on
the property if he knew of them when he purchased. That he
knew of the encumbrances may be inferred from his payment of
the interest. If the fact be that he agreed to take the house sub-
ject to these encumbrances, then he undertook to pay them and
indemnify the plaintiff, and is liable in this action. * * * Although
the defendant purchased the property, yet the plaintiff continued
liable, and Kearney became bound to indemnify him. The fact
whether he purchased subject to these encumbrances you will de-
termine; and if you determine in the affirmative, then it results
that if the plaintiff is bound to pay, the defendant is liable."
On error to the Supreme Court, ROGERS, J., said: "It has
been erroneously supposed that it was adjudged by the late Judge
McKEAN, that a purchaser of mortgaged premises, made himself
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personally liable to the mortgagee for the amount due on the mort-
gage. If such had been the decision, it was well calculated to
create alarm, as the assertion by high authority of a principle
heretofore not so. understood by the profession and most extensive
in its operation. I was pleased to find on a careful examination that
this does not appear to have been his opinion. The charge of the
court admits of this construction, and when fairly considered no
other meaning can be collected from it; that when there was an
agreement that the vendee should pay the mortgage-money and
afterwards the vendor had been compelled to pay the amount due
on the mortgage, he could sustain an action for money paid, laid
out and expended, against the purchaser. That an action will lie,
when there is a, special agreement, either express or implied from
the circumstances, is not denied; for it forms part of the purchase-
money or price of the land which it is just and in compliance with
his agreement that the vendee should pay." But the case which
gave direction to all the subsequent decisions was Campbel v.
Shnm, 3 Watts 60. Shrum entered into articles of agreement with
Astley and Gibson, for the purchase of land, which he agreed to
convey to Campbell, "subject to the payment of all the purchase-
money and interest now due on an article of agreement between
Thomas Astley and James Gibson of the one part and the said
Shrum of the other part." The purchase-money not having been
paid, Shrum brought an action in covenant to the use of Astley,
who had become clothed with Gibson's interest against Campbell
upon the agreement. SERGEANT, J., said: "Here the principal
consideration for Shrum's agreement to transfer to Campbell was that
Campbell should discharge the arrears due by Shrum for the land,
and relieve and exonerate him from his liability therefor. No one
that reads this clause can doubt that the understanding of the
parties was that Campbell agreed to do so. Without this construc-
tion, Shrum would have been left to pay Astley and Gibson in the
first instance, and afterwards be turned round to recover upon the
equitable claim for indemnity which he would have against Camp-
bell. Whereas, it was intended under the agreement, that Campbell
should pay off these arrears forthwith; and a breach of the under-
taking upon his part occurred when he omitted to do so, for 'which
Shrum could at once bring his action." Whether the construction
adopted was the only or the best one, it is too late to inquire, but
we may observe that Campbell's responsibility was held to be merely
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that of indemnifying Shrum, and that the action was brought not
in the name of Astley against Campbell, but in the name of Shrum
to the use of Astley. And no other form could have been sus-
tained in the face of the earlier decision of Beach v. -Morris, 12
S. & R. 16. Beach entered into articles of agreement for the sale
of land, purchase-money to be paid in instalments, with Wilson, who
assigned the articles subject to the payment of the whole purchase-
money to the defendant Morris. No purchase-money having been
paid, Beach brought an action of debt therefor against Morris.
TILGHMAN, C. J., 1I do not see how the action can be supported,
because between the plaintiff and the defendant there is no privity,
either of contract or estate. That there is no privity of contract
is evident, because privity of contract is personal privity and is con-
fined to the persons of the contracting parties, and there can be no
privity of estate, because the estate has never passed from the plain-
tiff. The assignment of Wilson passed to the defendant all the
right which Wilson had, that is to say, an equity by virtue of which
he was entitled to demand a conveyance on payment of the purchase-
money. Wilson, notwithstanding his assignment, remained liable
for the purchase-money on. his covenant in the articles of agreement
between him and the plaintiff, and from this liability -he could not
withdraw himself by substituting the defendant in his place. * * *
In no point of view is the plaintiff entitled to this action against
the defendant, who never made any kind of contract with him. The
plaintiff made his bargain with Wilson and kept the legal estate
in himself by way of security; and the defendant contracted not
with the plaintiff, but with Wilson, and is liable to Wilson on that
contract, whatever it may have been." That contract was one
of indemnity, as is shown by Campbell v. Shrum, which GIBSON,
C. J., in Blank v. German, 5 W. & S. 40, explained as follows:
"Had the plaintiffs below purchased the property subject to the
mortgage-debt, the case would have been within the principle of
Campbell v. Shrum, because the price would have been estimated
at the clear value less the mortgage-debt, and it may be said, that
so much of the price would have been virtually retained to answer
it; so that the plaintiff would have lost that much, had he been
compelled to pay with other funds than those set apart for the pur-
pose in the defendant's hands. As it would have been a fraud in
them to retain his money and let him be pursued for it on his bond,
they would have been held liable for it on an implied promise to
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apply it to the purpose intended. And it may be said in every
such case, that he who purchases expressly subject to an encum-
brance, as between the vendor and himself makes the debt his own,
which is the principle of Campbell v. Shrum." The expression
occasionally used in this opinion (and it is true of others), "subject
to an encumbrance," must be understood to mean, subject to the
payment of an encumbrance, which was the clause in the deed, as
the reporter's statement shows. The facts of W'oodward's Appeal,
2 Wright 326, were as follows: A guardian had purchased for her
ward premises " under and subject, nevertheless, to the payment
of a certain mortgage-debt or sum of $2000," and the court held
that by so doing, she had incurred a personal responsibility, against
which she should be indemnified by her ward's estate. Judge
STRONG said, in the course of his reasoning, without adopting either
view, that there were two explanations of the liability of a grantee
in such case. "Thus, in Blank v. German, 5 W. & S. 42, it was
stated to be a general principle that he who purchases expressly
subject to an encumbrance, as between the vendee and himself,
makes the debt his own. * * * There is a class of cases which
treat a purchase expressly subject to a charge or encumbranc'as
constituting an engagement by the vendee to indemnify the vendor
against loss or expense in consequence of the charge or encum-
brance. • * * But it is of no importance now to inquire whether
Mrs. Woodward, by taking a deed from Mr. Spackman for the
Arch street house, 'subject to the mortgage thereon,' assumed
the debt as between the grantor and herself, or whether she only.
engaged to indemnify him against being called upon to pay it."
The distinction as pointed out is without a difference. The last
two propositions are precisely the same. For the grantee to assume
a debt between himself and his grantor is to assume the debt for his
grantor only, and for no other person in the world; i. e. to indem-
nify him, and this appears from the words themselves as well as
from the cases where they are used synonymously. That Judge
STRONG thought so himself may be seen from his language in
Burke v. Gummey, 13 Wright 518:- 'We have no cases that are
not reconcilable with the doctrine that one who purchases expressly
subject to an encumbrance makes the debt his own, and assumes to
protect the vendor.' "
Taylor v. Preston, 29 P. F. Smith 136, is a literal repetition of
Campbell v. Shrum. In Girard Insurance Co. v. Stewart, 5 W.
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N. C. 87, a mortgagee brought assumpsit for a deficiency directly
against a grantee of the premises, under and subject to the pay-
ment of the mortgage, who pleaded that he took title as a mere dry
trustee, of which his grantor had full knowledge. The court held
the mortgagee could not recover, because the defendant personally
had not made any agreement about the mortgage at all.
But the law upon this point has been thrown into great uncer-
tainty by the later decisions arising out of the administration of
decedent's estates in contests between the heirs or devisees and the
personal representatives as to the fund out of which encumbrances
should be paid. In Kezey v. Kezey, 9 S. & R. 71, Kezey, Sr.,
devised a tract of land which he had bought from one Lowrie, sub-
ject to purchase-money due the Commonwealth, to his executor,
Kezey, Jr. The executor claimed credit in his account for payment
of the purchase-money, which was disallowed on the ground that the
decedent had never made it his personal debt. TILGHMAN, C. J.,
said, inter alia, "It may be considered, however, as very clear that
even supposing the original taker-up of the land (Lowrie) to have
been liable to an action for the purchase-money, that liability would
not extend to his assignee." In McCracken's Estate,. 5 Casey 427,
Socin had covenanted to convey land to Springer, purchase-money
to be paid in annual instalments; Springer, after paying several
instalments, assigned his interest in the land to McCracken, subject
to the payment of the unpaid instalments. McCracken, after paying
several instalments, died, having devised the land to his daughters,
who contended that they should be exonerated by the payment of the
instalments in arrear out of the decedent's personal estate. The
case appears to have been little considered by the counsel or by the
court. LowRIE, J., said, "Then comes the question, was the debt
due to H. Socin a debt of the estate ? We think it was ; for though
McCracken did not bind himself by covenant to pay the balance of
the purchase-money due to Socin, yet by buying the equitable title
and getting the assignment of the articles from Springer, he
impliedly undertook to pay the balance and keep Springer clear of
it. His debt or duty was directly to Springer, and through him
to Socin." The language of the court shows that there was no
intention to abandon the uniform doctrine of the previous cases
that the liability of the grantee was simply to indemnify his grantor.
But under Kezey v. Kezey, 8upra, and the English cases this
did not make the encumbrance his personal debt, so that it
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should be thrown for payment upon his personalty. The second
ground for the decision is the only one on which it can satisfactorily
rest, viz: that it was the manifest intention of the testator that his
daughters should take the land in fee discharged of the encum-
brances. The intention of the testator is the law of the will, and
it being clear there was no occasion to resort to arbitrary legal
principles designed to regulate administration in the absence of
intention. In Hoff"s Appeal, 12 Harris 200, the decedent devised
to his wife premises which he had purdhased for $13,900, no refer-
ence being made in the deed to any mortgage, but the receipt
endorsed on it was for $5500, "which with a certain mortgage
debt of $8400 made of the same premises by the above-named
Abner Elmes to Isaac Harvey, Jr., and the interest due and to grow
due thereon, are to be paid by the said John Hoff, is in full of the
consideration for the above granted premises." The court held that
the mortgage should be paid out of the personalty. WOODWARD,
J., said, " Now it is immaterial whether this amounted to a coven-
ant on the part of Hoff to pay the mortgage, though according to
the doctrine of Campbell v. Shrum, 3 Watts 60, and the cases
there cited, it might be easy to say it did; but surely there can be
no doubt he would be liable to an action for money had and received
at the suit of a mortgagee. * * * If then, Hoff in his purchase of
Reynolds, made himself liable to the mortgagee in any form of
action, how can we hesitate to call the mortgage his debt? It is
of no consequence that the mortgagee was not a party to the deal-
ings between Hoff and Reynolds, for it is a rudimental principle
that a party may sue on a promise made on sufficient consideration
for his use and benefit, though it be made to another and not to
himself. It is equally unimportant that the mortgagee's remedies
against the land remain unimpaired. The question before us does
not touch the specific lien of the mortgage, but the personal lia-
bility of the purchaser. He made himself liable to his vendor and
to the mortgagee, and he retained purchase-money enough in his
hands to indemnify himself. That money belonged to the mortga-
gee, and I hold he might have recovered it in assumpsit, if not in
covenant." This is the first time in Pennsylvania that a grantee
who had assumed a mortgage was held to have made it his own
personal debt, not only in the sense of the English cases so that
his executors shall pay it, but also so as to be himself liable to the
mortgagee at law. The decision appears to have been a clear
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departure from the principle upon which all the previous cases had
rested.
The New York authorities were not cited by the counsel or the
court, and the judgment appears to have been founded in part upon
Belvedere v. Bochfort, supra; a case that may be fairly considered
overruled, and in part' upon the argument of counsel therein, and
the discussion of it c6rtoned in 2 Powell on Devises 676. The
circumstances manifesting the intention of the testator to make the
encumbrance his own personal debt, were far less cogent than those
contained in that case, and it is to be regretted that a very doubt-
ful decision was extended any further. But we may positively
complain that the court should also adopt as law the contention of'
counsel that such a stipulation for the especial benefit of the
vendor, and incidentally for the benefit of the mortgagee, made the
vendee liable to the latter at law.
This has never been decided in England in any case, and in.
cases of administrators there, the question of the liability of a,
decedent's personalty to exonerate his realty from encumbrances, is,
at least independent of the circumstances of his liability to the
creditor at law. For instance, in .Parsons v. Freeman, he was
held to have made the encumbrance his own personal debt, although
it was admitted he had not made himself liable to the mortgagee
at law, and on the other hand, in many cases, Tankerville v.
Fawcett, Shafto v. Shafto, Mattheson v. Hardwileke, Hedge8 v.
Hedge, supra, he was held not to have made the encumbrance his
personal debt, although he had made himself liable to the owner of
it at law. But- the court joined them both together, and Lord
THURLOW'S argument while at the bar was precipitated as the law of
Pennsylvania. It was followed in Lennig's -state, 2 P. F. Smith
187. The decedent had bought the premises "in consideration of
$20,000 lawful money of the United States paid, &c., and of the
assumption of the said F. Lennig-of the two mortgages hereinafter
particularly mentioned." And in the receipt the assumption of
the two mortgages was mentioned as a part of the purchase-money.
The court held that the mortgages should be paid out of the
personal estate, relying upon Hoff's Appeal, supra, of which
AGNEW, J., said, "It is there held that where the purchaser paid
the full price of the land by including the encumbrances which he
assumed to pay as the entire consideration of the premises, the
purchaser made the debt his own, both as it regards the mortgagor
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and mortgagee, and that an action would lie for the mortgagee
against the purchaser for the amount of his encumbrance retained
out of the price." lifetzgar and Gernert's Appeal, 21 P. F. Smith
830, need only be noted in this connection as decided upon very
obvious principles, without involving any special discussion of the
point now under consideration. The following passage is quoted
simply to show that SHARSWOOD, J., did not lose sight of the quali-
fying phrase, the force of which escaped Judge STRONG in Wood-
ward's Appeal, supra. "That Georgb Steininger, Sr., was per-
sonally liable for the Mletzgar dower is undisputed. His deed to
his son, George Steininger, Jr., for the land upon which it was an
encumbrance subject to that dower as between him and the vendee
made it the debt of the latter."
It would be impossible to reconcile with previous and subsequent
decisions of the same court the purely obiter observations in Eoff's
Appeal and Lenniq's Estate, which were cases of administration,
about the direct liability of the purchaser of property under and
subject to the payment of a mortgage to the mortgagee at law.
The circumstance seems to have been overlooked in them that in
order that a third party may sue on a promise made to another for
his benefit, it must have been not incidentally so but for his especial
benefit. A trust must, as it were, be declared for him by the pro-
misce's giving to or leaving in the hands of the promisor money or
goods for his benefit: Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182; Hind v.
Holds/dp, 2 Id. 104; Vincent v. Watson, 6 Harris 96; Beer v.
Robinson, 9 Barr 229; Campbell v. Lacock, 4 Wright 448; Torren8
v. Campbell, 24 P. F. Smith 471; Nelson v. Blight, 1 Johns. Cas.
205; Weston v. Barker, 12 Johns. 276.
Indeed under the last judicial statement of the principle in
Pennsylvania, it would seem impossible to apply it in favor of a
mortgagee: Kountz v. Holthouse, 5 W. N. C. 468. MERcUR, J.:
"The general rule is that an action on a contract, whether express
or implied, must be brought in the name of the party in whom the
legal interest in such contract was vested: 1 Chit. Plead. 2. Yet
many cases are to be found in which the right of a third person to
sue has been sustained on a promise made to another. Hence, if
one pay money to another for the use of a third person, or having
money belonging to another, agree with that other to pay it to a
third, an action lies by the person beneficially interested. This
right of action is not restricted to cases of money only, but extends
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to an agreement to deliver over any valuable, so that such third
party is the only party in interest. But when a debt already
exists, a promise by a third person to pay such debt being for the
benefit of the original debtor and to protect him against it, he must
necessarily have a right of action against his promisor to secure
that protection. If the third person also become liable to the
original creditor, he would be subject to two separate actions at the
same time, and for the same debt. This would be manifestly unjust."
But until two cases to be considered presently were reported, the
profession in Pennsylvania remained in a state of honest doubt
whether the decisions in foff's Appeal and Lennig's -Estate
were to be restricted to cases of the administration of decedents'
estates where similar language should be found, or whether the
doctrine of indemnity was to be absolutely abandoned and the law
adopted as now laid down in the state of New York. In Moore's
Appeal, 86 Leg. Int. 96, the intestate had purchased preliises "for
the consideration of the sum of $9500, * * * under and subject,
nevertheless, to the payment of the aforesaid mortgage-debt of
$8500, and the interest due and to grow due thereon." The
receipt was for $9500, "being the full consideration-money above
mentioned." The question was between the heir and the personal
representative whether the intestate had not made the mortgage his
own personal debt so as to entitle the heir to be exonerated from it
out of the personal estate. The Orphans' Court decided this ques-
tion against the heir, saying, inter alia: "1 The result of the cases
is this, that the promise of W. F. Moore, the decedent, as shown by
his deed of purchase, was a promise of indemnity upon which his
vendor would have recovered against the decedent only after pay-
ment by himself of the mortgage-debt, and upon which the mort-
gagee could not have maintained a personal action against the dece-
dent." The Supreme Court affirmed the decree, SHARSWOOD, J.,
saying: "The question then is, did the decedent make this. mort-
gage-debt his own so as to entitle his heir to call upon the personal
estate to exonerate the land ? An examination of the cases which
have been decided on the legal effect of such a clause in a convey-
ance shows, we think, that unless there exist special circumstances
to raise a covenant to pay the encumbrance, it amounts only to an
indemnity to the vendor." In Samuel v. Peyton, 36 Leg. Int. 96,
Wheeler, being the owner of a tract of ground, agreed to convey
the .atme to Kressler for $7500, and to advance him the further
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sum of $35,700, to build fifty houses thereon, Wheeler to be
secured by a bond and mortgage on each house, the houses alone
to be liable for the amount of the bonds, and neither Kress-
ler nor his assigns to be personally liable therefor. To carry out
this intention Wheeler conveyed the land to Pierie, a man of straw,
who executed the fifty bonds and mortgages to Wheeler, and then
conveyed the premises to Kressler. The plaintiffs, by divers as-
signments, became the owner of one of these bonds and mortgages,
and the defendant, by divers conveyances, the owner of the pre-
mises, under and subject to the payment of it. The plaintiff sold
the premises under the mortgage, and brought an action of assump-
sit against the defendant, who had ceased to have any title or inter-
est therein, for the deficiency. The defendant pleaded specially
the agreement between Wheeler and Kressler that the latter and
his assigns should not be personally liable upon the bonds, to which
the plaintiff demurred, and the court below sustained the demurrer.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, SHARSWOOD, C. J., say-
ing: "In Moore's Appeal, which has just been decided, it has been
held by this court that the conveyance of land ' under and subject'
to a mortgage or other encumbrance, is of itself a covenant of
indemnity only for the protection of the vendor. It was shown in
that case, on a review of the authorities, that it was only where
there was an express agreement to pay the encumbrance, or where
such agreement might be implied from the circumstances, that there
was liability to the encumbrancer, or that he could sue in the name
of the vendog to his use. The vendor must sue, and must show
that he has been damnified; or at least must show that his danger
of damnification is imminent. . The special, pleas in this case not
only expressly denied any agreement by the defendant to pay the
mortgage, but averred a state of things which showed that his
vendor never could be damnified. If it was expressly agreed that
the first grantee from the party creating the encumbrance should
not be personally liable, it is evident that no subsequent grantee
could become so without his own express agreement. The first
link in the chain by which a subsequent grantee might be called
upon to indemnify his vendor would be wanting. On the demurrer
to the special pleas .of the defendant, we think he was entitled to
judgment."
These cases deliberately adopt, as the law of Pennsylvania, the
theory that the purchaser of premises under and subject to the
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payment of a mortgage does not make it his personal debt, but
only undertakes to indemnify his grantor, and that he cannot there-
fore be made directly liable in assumpsit to the mortgagee.
Finally, so far is the doctrine from public approbation that an
Act of June 12, 1878, has been passed to destroy the risponsibility
of the grantee in its unqualified shape, and to rest what is left of it
upon the doctrine of indemnity.
In Massachusetts, the liability of the grantee who assumes en-
cumbrances, is that of indemnifying his grantor: Pikev. Brown,
7 Cush. 138; Brannan v. -Dowse, 12 Cush. 228. And the mort-
gagee, for want of privity, cannot maintain an action against such
grantee: Miller v. Whipple, 1 Gray 31. The language of Tumas
v. -Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, was not intended to disturb either of
these principles, as may be seen by reference to Pettee v. Pennard,
120 Mass. 522. And in the administration of the estate of a dece-
dent who has bought subject to a mortgage forming part of the
consideration, the mortgage will remain charged upon the realty,
unless the will manifest an intention that it shall be paid out of the
personalty: Hfewes v. )Dehon, 3 Gray 205; Andrews v. Bishop,
5 Allen 491.
In Connecticut, the purchaser of an equity of redemption incurs
no liability for encumbrances: Post v. Bank, 28 Conn. 483. But
if he agree to buy subject to the encumbrance, and it is deducted
from the purchase-money, he will be held to have undertaken to
indemnify his grantor: Townsend v. Ward, 27 Conn. 614. In
Poster v. Atwater, 42 Conn. 250, the mortgagee was allowed to
sue the grantee who had assumed the mortgage directly, but not
from any principle of privity, but because the grantee having
assigned to him all his right of action, he was allowed by statute to
proceed in his own name.
In Iowa, the purchaser of an equity of redemption is not held
liable for the mortgage-debt: Johnson v. Morrell, 13 Iowa 300 ;
but when he has assumed it, he is subject to the same rules of law
as ultimately adopted in New York: 0orbet v. Watsman, 11 Iowa
86; Moses v. The Olerk, 12 Id. 139; Thompson v. Bertram, Id.
476; Scott's Adm'r v. Gill, 19 Id. 187; Bowen v. Kuntz, 37 Id.
240; Beam- v. Jack, 44 Id. 325.
See also Story's Eq. Jur., vol. 1, see. 574-576; vol. 2, see.
248; Thomas on Mortgages, ch. 9 and 15; Jones on Mortgages
Ch. 15-17.
